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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, based on Utah Code Ann. §78A-4103(2)(j), in that this case was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme
Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in striking paragraphs 5, 9, 10, and 12 of the
Affidavit of Chad Edgington where they lacked foundation, were conclusory, and were based
on a document Chad Edgington was not qualified to interpret? The district court's decision
to strike portions of the Affidavit of Chad Edgington is "reviewed under a broad grant of
discretion." In re: Rights to Use All Water, Murdoch v. Springville Mun. Corp., 982 P.2d 65,
72 (Utah 1999).
Did the trial court properly grant summary judgment to Defendants based on Utah's
statute of repose where the only admissible evidence showed that the improvement was
completed more than twelve years before the fire? "Because a summary judgment presents
questions of law, we review the trial court's ruling for correctness." Id. at 69.
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to receive the untimely affidavit of
Dallas Monsen? Review is for abuse of discretion. Pratt v. Nelson, 127 P.3d 1256,1261-62
(Utah App. 2005).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, ETC,
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-21.5 (1999) appears in the appendix.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Fires on December 19 and 20,2002, substantially damaged the home of Chad and Ann

Edgington. The Edgingtons were insured with State Farm Fire and Casualty Company
("State Farm"). State Farm alleged that the fire was caused by a pellet stove flue pipe
installed during the construction of the home twelve years before the fires. State Farm
reached this conclusion after it hired a fire investigator who removed the subject pellet stove
and flue following the fire, but who also subsequently destroyed the pellet stove and flue.
The subject pellet stove and flue were not available for inspection by the defense.
The only piece of physical evidence in the summary judgment record referring to the
installation of the pellet stove and its flue is an invoice from November 1990. The only
admissible testimony regarding the date of installation of the stove is from the deposition of
Boyd Nebeker, stating that the pellet stove and its venting were installed in November 1990
(R. 139-40, Nebeker Depo. 21:4, 28:13-29:1). The undisputed facts in the summary
judgment record showed that the pellet stove and flue were installed in November, 1990 and
that Mr. Nebeker was paid for the material during the first week of December, 1990.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below
Defendants filed for summary judgment, because all evidence showed that the pellet

stove and venting had been installed over 12 years before the fire. In response to the
summary judgment motion, Plaintiff prepared an Affidavit for Chad Edgington which
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attempted to establish that the venting of the pellet stove was installed after December 19,
1990, the 12-year cut-off under Utah's Statute of Repose. The affidavit was based on
conclusions after reviewing an inspection card that Chad Edgington was not qualified to
interpret. The Defendants moved to strike inadmissible portions of Mr. Edgington's
affidavit. Oral argument was initially heard on April 19,2007. At the time of oral argument,
Plaintiff attempted to introduce an additional affidavit from one Dallas Monsen. The district
court rejected the additional affidavit as untimely. Without deciding the summary judgment
motion at that time, the Court asked the parties to conduct additional research on a very
limited issue. The Court did not give the parties leave to file additional affidavits, nor did
counsel for Plaintiff request leave to file additional affidavits.
Supplemental briefs were submitted by both parties following the first oral argument.
Without seeking leave of Court, Plaintiff submitted the Affidavit of Dallas Monsen with its
supplemental memorandum. The defense moved to strike the untimely affidavit of Dallas
Monsen. The district court, in a detailed and thoroughly reasoned decision, struck certain
portions of the affidavit of Chad Edgington, granted Defendants' motion for summary
judgment, and struck the affidavit of Dallas Monsen.
C.

Statement of Facts
Chad Edgington was involved in the construction of his own home in Fruit Heights.

He was the owner and general contractor for his home and hired the subcontractors. (R.387,
pp. 33-34). He was not a licensed general contractor, nor did he have the knowledge of a
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licensed contractor. (R. 387, p. 33). Chad Edgington selected and purchased a pellet stove.
(R. 387, p.35). He requested that Nebeker install and vent the pellet stove. Nebeker did so
as a favor, only charging for parts, but not for any labor. (R. 205, Nebeker Depo. 8:11-24,
10:4-12). It is undisputed by the parties that the pellet stove was not the main heating system
for the house, that Mr. Edgington selected and purchased the stove himself, and that he asked
Boyd Nebeker to install it for him. (R. 205, Chad Edgington Depo. 28:3-8, 29:1-19, 40:2541:9, 45:16-20, 52:9-16; Ann Edgington Depo. 11:16-17; Boyd Nebeker Depo. 7:21-8:19).
Installation of a pellet stove on Plaintiffs real property by Defendant was conducted
and completed in mid-November, 1990. (R. 139-40, Nebeker Depo. at 21:4, 28:13-29:1).
The installation of the pellet stove took about 4 hours. (R. 140, Nebeker Depo. at 21:11,
28:25). Installation of the pellet stove consisted of placing the pellet stove, and coming back
after a day or two to do the venting. (R.140, Nebeker Depo. at 28:13-29:1). None of
Defendant's service calls after installation involved the pellet stove. (R. 140, Ann Edgington
Depo. at 23:8-18). Boyd Nebeker's only invoice mentioning the pellet stove is dated
November 1990 (R. 387, p.10). In fact, the only other invoice for Nebeker's work from the
period is also dated November 1990. (Id.). Both invoices show payment dates of 12-4-90.
(Id.). The fire that is the subject of the present lawsuit occurred on or about December 19,
2002. (R. 3, Complaint, If 11). More than twelve years separate Defendant's completion of
the work and the fire that forms the basis of Plaintiffs present suit. Plaintiff commenced its
action by filing a complaint on or about December 16, 2004. (See R.6, Complaint).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The district court's decision to strike portions of the Affidavit of Chad Edgington is
"reviewed under a broad grant of discretion." In re: Rights to Use All Water, Murdoch v.
SpringvilleMun. Corp., 982 P.2d 65, 72 (Utah 1999). Plaintiff admits that Chad Edgington
in his affidavit drew conclusions from an inspection card. (R. 3, Plaintiffs Brief, p. 11).
Chad Edgington neither prepared the inspection card, nor was he qualified to interpret it.
The district court struck four paragraphs of the affidavit based on inadmissibility of the
averments. An affiant's statements must be based on personal knowledge and not be
conclusory. Mr. Edgington's statements failed that test. See, Murdoch v. Springville Mun.
Corp., 982 P.2d at 72.
The pellet stove is an improvement under the statute and was possessed by the
Edgington's as soon as the installation was complete. Possession has nothing to do with
occupancy nor alleged demonstrations of use. Possession under Utah's Statute of Repose
(U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5(l)(c)) cannot mean occupancy without rendering superfluous the
legislature's "first use or possession" prong. Additionally, possession is not another way of
saying first use. Instead, a person assumes possession of an improvement when control of
the improvement passes from installer to the one requesting installation regardless of
occupancy or use.
The Affidavit of Dallas Monsen was untimely, and the district court was well within
its discretion to strike it.
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ARGUMENT
The Utah State Legislature has determined that "it is in the best interests of the
citizens of the state to impose" a statute of repose "upon all causes of action by or against a
provider arising out o f the "installation of an improvement." U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5(2)(e).
A provider means, among other things, someone contributing to construction. U.C.A. § 7812-21.5(l)(f). The Legislature determined that exposing a provider to lawsuits "after the
possibility of injury or damage has become highly remote... unexpectedly creates costs and
hardships to the provider and the citizens of the state." U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5(2)(a). "[T]hese
costs and hardships include liability insurance costs, records storage costs, undue and
unlimited liability risks during the life of both a provider and an improvement, and
difficulties in defending against claims many years after completion of an improvement"
U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5(2)(b).

"[T]hese costs and hardships constitute clear social and

economic evils." U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5(2)(c). "[T]he possibility of injury and damage
becomes highly remote and unexpected ten years following completion" of the improvement.
U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5(2)(d).
To remedy these "clear social and economic evils," the Legislature passed a statute
of repose that prohibits an action from being "commenced against a provider more than 12
years after completion of the improvement." If "the cause of action is discovered or
discoverable in the eleventh or twelfth year," the plaintiff has two years from that date in
which to bring an action. U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5(4).
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This case epitomizes the concerns that led the Utah Legislature to enact a construction
statute of repose. One of the legislature's stated reasons for enacting the statute of repose
is "the difficulties in defending against claims many years after completion of an
improvement." U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5(2)(b) (1999). Witnesses have been lost, documents
have been lost or discarded, and memories have failed. Now Boyd Nebeker must try to
defend himself against claims that the installation of a pellet stove he performed back in 1990
(over 17 years ago) was defective. A problem first arising in December 2002 was blamed
on the installation of the pellet stove despite 12 years of problem-free use.
The appeal boils down to two central issues: (1) whether the relevant improvement
was the pellet stove or the house, and (2) whether an issue of fact exists regarding when the
installation of the pellet stove was substantially complete. Boyd Nebeker presented
affirmative, admissible evidence that the pellet stove and its flue were installed in November
of 1990. December 19, 1990, twelve years before the fire, is the date after which the
improvement must be completed under the statute for Plaintiff to have a claim. The only
record evidence that could push the completion of the pellet stove beyond December 19,
1990, is the Affidavit of Chad Edgington, the relevant portions of which the district court
determined were inadmissible.
Defendants set forth the following facts in their memorandum in support of summary
judgment that were undisputed by State Farm. Installation of the pellet stove consisted of
placing the pellet stove and coming back after a day or two to do the venting. The
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installation was a small job (about 4 hours). Boyd never had a service call related to the
pellet stove after its installation. Installation of the pellet stove was complete mid-November
1990. All of these facts were set forth with appropriate citations to the sworn deposition
testimony of Boyd Nebeker and Ann Edgington.
Plaintiff did not specifically dispute any of the facts in Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment as required by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7(c)(3)(B):
A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain a
verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is controverted,
and may contain a separate statement of additional facts in dispute. For each
of the moving party's facts that is controverted, the opposing party shall
provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute, supported by citation
to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials.
Although Plaintiff did not separately dispute any of Defendants' facts, the fair import of the
Affidavit of Chad Edgington is that the completion date of the pellet stove flue is
disputed—as it has to be for Plaintiff to continue to allege its case is not barred by the Statute
of Repose. No other facts from Defendants' memorandum are specifically disputed.
Additional undisputed facts were established in the pleadings and hearings:
Homeowner Chad Edgington selected and purchased the pellet stove at issue in this
litigation. He asked Boyd Nebeker to install it for him. Boyd did so. The pellet stove was
not part of the house's main heating and cooling system. Boyd never charged any labor for
installation of the pellet stove. Boyd's only invoice mentioning the pellet stove is dated
November 1990 (R. 387, p. 10).
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I.

CHAD EDGINGTON AFFIDAVIT PARAGRAPHS PROPERLY STRICKEN
The only factual dispute alleged by Plaintiff is the completion date of the venting of

the pellet stove based on the Affidavit of Chad Edgington submitted with Plaintiffs
opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Because Defendants supported their motion
for summary judgment with citations to deposition testimony, Plaintiff could not rely on its
pleadings but had to present affirmative evidence of a material fact in dispute. See URCP
56. Whether any fact is in dispute hinges on the admissibility of Chad Edgington's Affidavit.
The standard of review for the district courf s decision to strike an affidavit is set forth
in the Utah Supreme Court decision In re: Rights to Use All Water, Murdoch v. Springville
Mun. Corp., 982 P.2d 65, 72 (Utah 1999):
There is no established standard for reviewing a decision striking affidavits.
However, since an affidavit is simply a method of placing evidence of a fact
before the court, we look to our prior decisions regarding the admission of
evidence more generally. The standard of review for the admission of evidence
varies depending on the type of evidence at issue. For example, in State v.
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994), we stated that the decision to admit
evidence under Utah Rule of Evidence 403 was on the "broad end of the
[discretion] spectrum" like "other rulings on the admission of evidence [that]
also generally entail a good deal of discretion," but in cases involving other
categories of evidence, such as the admission of evidence that might violate
the Fourth Amendment, "we narrow the [discretion granted] considerably for
policy reasons." See id. (citations omitted). The same is true of evidence that
has a high potential for unfair prejudice. See, e.g., State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d
1221,1229 (Utah 1997) (holding admission of gruesome videotape as error).
In civil cases such as the present one, where the evidence sought to be
introduced does not raise concerns of the type that have produced heightened
standards of sensitivity, a trial court decision to admit evidence is reviewed
under a broad grant of discretion. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 938.
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(Emphasis added).1
"The next question is whether the trial court overstepped its broad discretion in
[striking portions of the Affidavit of Chad Edgington]." Id. In the Murdoch case, the Utah
Supreme Court held that where affidavits contain many facts that "are not based on personal
knowledge, lack foundation, are conclusory, and contain hearsay,... the trial court did not
exceed the discretion granted it in striking the affidavits." Id.
Plaintiff cites two phrases from the Affidavit of Chad Edgington taken out of context
and alleges that these two statements constitute an independent recollection defeating
summary judgment. However, these statements appear quite differently in their true context.
Read as paragraphs or as the affidavit as a whole, it is clear that the statements are not
admissible and the trial court was acting properly and within its broad discretion as the
gatekeeper of admissible evidence when it struck the four paragraphs.
Chad Edgington's allegedly "independent recollection" only concludes that the pellet
stove and flue installation was completed at the "latter stages on construction." Any attempt
to give a date to the stages of construction improperly relies on the inspection card.
Chad Edgington has a dependent recollection that arose after he was deposed. That

^tate Farm cited Dimick v. OHC Liquidation Trust, 2007 UT App 73, U12, 157
P.3d 347, 350, for the proposition that the trial court's ruling on the admissibility of an
affidavit is reviewed for correctness. Dimick did not concern an affidavit, and State Farm
omits the following qualifying language regarding the standard of review: "Nevertheless,
because application of the hearsay rules in a specific case is so highly fact-dependent, a
district court's conclusions on such issues are entitled to some measure of deference."
Wayment v. Clear Channel Broad, Inc., 2005 UT 25,1144, 116 P.3d 271.
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recollection, as per the plain language of the affidavit, came after a review of an inspection
card not prepared by Mr. Edgington and not reviewed by Mr. Edgington for 14 years—a card
Mr. Edgington is not competent to interpret—a card that never mentions the pellet stove.
The first sentence of paragraph 3 of Chad Edgington's Affidavit states, "Since my
deposition on September 28, 2005, I have had the opportunity to review a copy of the
Inspection Card which was filled out by the building inspectors of my home." Indeed, the
paragraphs that follow frequently mention and rely on that review of the inspection card.
Paragraph 5 of Chad Edgington's affidavit is a perfect example:
I am attaching hereto as Exhibit " 1 " and incorporating herein by this
reference a copy of the aforementioned Inspection Card, which card I copied
from Exhibit " 1 " of the transcript of the September 28, 2005 Ann Edgington
deposition and which was used by the building inspectors as they inspected the
ongoing construction on my Fruit Heights home. As can be seen from the
Inspection Card, the actual construction of the home commenced in
September, 1990. The footings of the home were inspected and approved on
September 18th and 21st of 1990. The foundation reinforcing steel was
approved on October 4,1990, the ground plumbing was approved on October
11, 1990, and the slab was approved on October 22, 1990. Most notable,
framing and ventilation was inspected on December 18, 1990, but was not
checked or signed off, and instead has the marking "N.C." / believe this
marking stands for "Not Complete." A second entry on December 18,1990
under the heading of "rough heating" is also not checked or signed off, and
clearly states "not finished." At the bottom of the inspection card is a note
which states "If work is not marked approved, make corrections noted under
remarks and call for another inspection before continuing work." I did not
secure an inspection of the completed framing, ventilation, or rough heating
until early 1991. This would include the pellet stove and flue which were
installed by Boyd Nebeker. The Inspection Card confirms my memory that
Mr. Nebeker did not complete his work on the pellet stove and flue until the
latter part of the construction of my Fruit Heights home, which was in early
1991.
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(Emphasis added).
Paragraph 5 was properly stricken because it is speculative, it lacks foundation that
Mr. Edgington is competent to interpret the Inspection Card, and lacks foundation to support
the conclusions he draws about the markings on the card. State Farm, through Mr.
Edgington, is attempting to interpret marks on the inspection card, which marks were made
by another individual approximately 14 or 15 years earlier than the affidavit was submitted.
The Affidavit uses interpretation of the inspection card markings to determine that certain
stages of construction were in 1991 as opposed to 1990.
The district court indicated that Mr. Edgington's conclusion that "N.C." meant "not
complete" was "pure speculation." (R. 387, 35:22-36:5). Plaintiff conceded that whether
the framing and ventilation mentioned in the card included the pellet stove was uncertain, (R.
387,36:6-9), and yet Chad Edgington bases his dates and his definition of "latter stages" on
the assertion that the pellet stove was included in the framing and ventilation and that the
inspector found them "not complete."
Paragraph 9 of Chad Edgington's Affidavit states,
The above-referenced invoices [invoices of Boyd Nebeker prepared by
Boyd Nebeker] were primarily for parts and materials only. Mr. Nebeker did
not bill me for his labor until sometime after he finished installing the pellet
stove, flue, and heating and air conditioning systems in early 1991. Attached
hereto as Exhibit "4" and incorporated herein by this reference is an invoice
wherein Mr. Nebeker bills me for labor and materials which he provided for
the basement fireplace, flue pipe and duct work for my Fruit Heights home in
1996.
(Bracketed material added).
-12-

Paragraph 9 was properly stricken because the conclusions lack foundation, and it is
speculative, and there is nothing in these invoices to support the conclusion that the pellet
stove was completed in 1991. State Farm, through Mr. Edgington, is attempting to interpret
what Mr. Edgington believed was established on the Inspection Card and Boyd Nebeker's
invoices without proper foundational support. It is undisputed that the 1996 invoice dealt
with an unrelated fireplace later added to the home and had nothing whatsoever to do with
the installation of the pellet stove. (R. 387, p. 72:19-20).
Paragraph 10 of Chad Edgington's Affidavit states,
I am positive that Mr. Nebeker did not finish his work on the pellet
stove and flue in the home until early 1991. In fact, I have an independent
recollection of the pellet stove and flue not being completed until the latter
stages of the construction of my home. The Building Permit was issued on
October 15,1990, at which time only the foundation and ground plumbing had
been approved by the inspector. The framing and rough heating were not
complete on December 18,1990 for the inspector, and they were not complete
until early 1991. The framing and rough heating would need to be completed
and passed off by the inspector long before I considered the home to be near
the latter stages of construction.
Paragraph 10 was properly stricken because Plaintiff did not lay foundation to show
that Mr. Edgington had firsthand knowledge about the specific contents of the Inspection
Card or that he was qualified to interpret the marks on that card, and because the conclusions
are speculative. Mr. Edgington's statement regarding timing is the vague, subjective, and
conclusory "latter stages of the construction of my home." Any attempt to tie that to a
calendar date improperly relies on the inspection card Mr. Edgington is not competent to
interpret. The only facts supporting the affiant's conclusion are from the inspection card.
-13-

In fact, Mr. Edgington defines "latter stages of construction" in terms of the framing and
rough heating inspections on the inspection card.
Even if the "n.c." on the inspection card means "not complete" as Mr. Edgington
opines, it begs the question of why the venting was tendered for examination if it was not
substantially complete. Although the buzzwords "independent recollection" appear in
paragraph 10, the date of October 15, 1990, comes from the building permit, and the date
December 18,1990, clearly comes from the inspection card. Also, the terms "framing" and
"rough heating" are lifted from the inspection card. Mr. Edgington's unsubstantiated
conclusion that certain portions of construction were not complete based on the inspection
card is then used to define what "latter stages of construction" means as far as a calendar
date. By the plain language of the affidavit, irrespective of any external evidence, the
recollection styled as "independent" is clearly based on conclusions reached after reviewing
the inspection card.
Paragraph 12 of Chad Edgington's Affidavit states,
For the reasons set forth above, the pellet stove was not installed prior
to December 20,1990, and Mr. Nebeker's work on the pellet stove and flue (as
well as the rest of the heating and air conditioning work) was not completed
by him until early 1991.
Paragraph 12 was properly stricken because it is conclusory, and is based on other
inadmissible paragraphs in Mr. Edgington's affidavit and is, therefore, not admissible.
The trial court properly struck portions of the affidavit of Chad Edgington. In fact,
Plaintiff in its brief concedes, "Mr. Edgington did draw some conclusions from the
-14-

inspection card itself." (Plaintiffs Brief p. 11). Plaintiff tries to spotlight a few words in the
affidavit, but those words must be considered in context. Otherwise, an attorney could
always defeat summary judgment through artful wording of an affidavit.
Chad Edgington was deposed in this case. Plaintiff does not cite Chad Edgington's
deposition testimony in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Instead, State
Farm's counsel prepared an affidavit for Mr. Edgington to sign. In fairness to State Farm and
Mr. Edgington, it is extremely difficult to draft an affidavit based on personal knowledge
with proper foundation sixteen years after the fact. That is precisely why the Legislature
adopted the statute of repose—the cases become too cumbersome to prosecute or defend
when memories have faded, witnesses have moved away, and few documents have been
retained. While the deficiencies of Mr. Edgington's Affidavit are understandable given the
passage of so much time, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) was not complied with.
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an affidavit submitted
in opposition to a summary judgment motion meet certain criteria. The affidavit "shall be
made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence,
and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated
therein." The Affidavit of Chad Edgington did not meet the admissibility standard and the
four paragraphs were properly stricken.
Affidavits not meeting the standard of Rule 56(e) are subject to motions to strike.
These requirements mirror those that apply to all evidence, and our case law
on excluding affidavit evidence supports this. See, e.g., Treloggan v.
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Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747,748 (Utah 1985) (affidavit based on unsubstantiated
belief insufficient); Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983)
(conclusory affidavits are invalid); GNS Partnership v. Fullmer, 873 P.2d
1157, 1164-65 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (affidavits not based on personal
knowledge were properly stricken).
In re: Rights to Use All Water, Murdoch v. Springville Mun. Corp., 982 P.2d 65, 72 (Utah
1999).
We have reviewed the affidavits ourselves. Many of the facts they assert are
not based on personal knowledge, lack foundation, are conclusory, and contain
hearsay. Consequently, we hold that the trial court did not exceed the
discretion granted it in striking the affidavits.
Id.
An affidavit opposing a motion for summary judgment needs to contain specific
evidentiary facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d
747 (Utah 1985). Speculative and conclusory statements are insufficient.
To raise a genuine issue of fact, an affidavit must do more than reflect the
affiant's opinions and conclusions. Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation, 29
Utah 2d 274,508 P.2d 538 (1973). The affidavit must "set forth specific facts"
showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). The mere
assertion that an issue of fact exists without a proper evidentiary foundation to
support that assertion is insufficient to preclude the granting of a summary
judgment motion. Leininger v. Stearns Roger Mfg., 17 Utah 2d 37, 404 P.2d
33 (1967).
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983).
The district court did not weigh the evidence but made evidentiary rulings within its
discretion that certain statements were admissible, and certain statements were inadmissible,
and on that basis granted summary judgment. The district court in the April 19, 2007,
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hearing articulated the admissibility problem with Mr. Edgington5s affidavit:
THE COURT:... Mr. Nebeker has said it was in November of 1990 because
here is my invoice, I billed them at this time and the implication is I install it,
then I get paid, here's the bill. That's clearly admissible.
With respect to Mr. [Edgington,] he is testifying and then he says to
confirm my testimony, here's the inspection record which he interprets and his
interpretation of the inspection record is not admissible because he didn't
prepare it because the person that did prepare it is not here to indicate the
scope of the inspection and therein is the difference. And for him to say then
the inspection record confirms my recollection is based on testimony so far as
what's established thus far in the case on inadmissible evidence. That's the
problem.
(R. 387, p.44). The Affidavit of Chad Edgington suffers from glaring deficiencies. The
district court was well within its broad discretion to strike the offending paragraphs.
II.

NO MATERIAL FACTS IN DISPUTE
The only admissible evidence is that the pellet stove and its flue were completed in

late November 1990. The stove was selected and purchased by Chad Edgington. Plaintiff
cites no authority that Boyd Nebeker had a duty to show Chad Edgington how to operate the
pellet stove. Likewise there is no authority supporting Plaintiffs conclusion that substantial
completion of the improvement under Utah's statute of repose did not occur until Mr.
Nebeker showed Mr. Edgington how to use the stove.
There is no valid issue for a jury to decide, and summary judgment was appropriate.
III.

PELLET STOVE IS AN IMPROVEMENT
The other issue Plaintiff raises on appeal is whether the pellet stove or the house was

the relevant improvement under the statute. State Farm itself defined the improvement at
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issue in paragraph 10 of its Complaint. State Farm alleges that Defendants "installed a
'pellet stove' in the Edgington's residence, including all ductwork, flues, venting, and the
like." (R. 3,1110). State Farm identified the provider(s) to which it attributed liability (Boyd
Nebeker and his company) and the work which it alleged was defective (the installation of
the pellet stove and its flue).
After Defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis of the statute of repose,
however, Plaintiff had to get past the repose date of December 19,1990, and argued that the
relevant improvement under the statute was the house rather than the pellet stove. As
Plaintiff states in its brief, "the house was not completed until April 1991, so this action is
timely if the statute of repose is calculated from completion] of the entire house." (Plaintiffs
Brief, p. 15). Consequently, State Farm argued strenuously below that a pellet stove could
not be an improvement under the reasoning of State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Sundance
Dev. Corp., 78 P.3d 995 (Utah App. 2003) and that the house had to be the relevant
improvement. (R. 259-60). Defendants pointed out that the Sundance case involved the
filing of a plat map, and that filing a paper with county does not "improve" the land, whereas
a pellet stove is a physical addition and improvement to the land. (R. 277).
A.

Stoves, Water Mains, Natural Gas Lines Constitute "Improvements"
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5(l)(d) (1999) defines an improvement as "any building,

structure, infrastructure, road, utility, or other similar man-made change, addition,
modification, or alteration to real property." Plaintiff focused on the words "building" and
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"similar" and concluded before the trial court that the improvement must have been the
Edgingtons' house. At the July 19, 2007, hearing, the district court asked State Farm if a
foundation could be an improvement. State Farm parsed the definition of an improvement
in §78-12-21.5—"is it similar to a building or a structure, infrastructure, road or utility? I
would have to say no." (R. 387, p. 92). State Farm also concluded that a furnace could not
improve real property by the same reasoning. (R. 387, p.93).
However, State Farm's reading of the statute is artificially restrictive. Clearly, a house
as a building falls with in the statute. However, other things built, constructed, or installed
on the land also constitute improvements. A road on the property is an improvement.
Installation of water pipes and gas lines appear to qualify under both infrastructure and
utility. Installation of a pellet stove is very similar to installation of gas or water lines.
Clearly, the statute is not limited to buildings. The Edgingtons added a fireplace five or six
years after the completion of the home, and there can be no serious question under a
common-sense reading of the statute that the fireplace was an improvement.
While Utah courts have upheld the constitutionality of Utah's Statute of Repose,2 as
yet there has been little opportunity for interpretive guidance from the courts regarding the
statute. Therefore, a look at how other states have examined statutes of repose is helpful.
The Georgia Court of Appeals examined whether a fireplace could be considered an

2

Craftsman Builder's Supply, Inc. v. Butler Manufacturing Co., 91A P.2d 1194
(Utah 1999)(upholding the constitutionality of former U.C.A. § 78-12-25.5 (1996)).
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improvement under Georgia's statute of repose. The court considered three factors set forth
in a prior decision and then applied a common sense analysis. Hanna v. McWilliams, 446
SE2d 741 (Ga. App. 1994). The three factors were "(1) is the improvement permanent in
nature; (2) does it add to the value of the realty, for the purposes for which it was intended
to be used; (3) was it intended by the contracting parties that the improvement' in question
be an improvement to real property or did they intend for it to remain personalty." Mullis v.
Southern Company Services, Inc., 296 SE2d 579 (Ga. 1982).
The Georgia Court of Appeals
conclude[d] the fireplace was an improvement to the real property within the
meaning of OCGA § 9-3-51(a) [Georgia's statute of repose]. The fireplace
component obviously was an integral part of the house; it was not a mere frill,
but an alternative heat source of economic and aesthetic value. . . . As the
fireplace 'itself is an improvement to the real property and as the date of its
substantial completion is capable of proof, it is the date of the substantial
completion of the fireplace and not of the entire house which controls in
determining the date of commencement of the eight-year period in the statute
of repose in this case.
Hanna v. McWilliams, 446 SE2d 741 (bracketed materials added). The same argument
applies despite the admitted differences in Georgia's and Utah's statutes. The pellet stove
was an integral part of the home, an alternative heat source of economic and aesthetic value,
and not a mere frill. Under a common sense, plain language analysis, the pellet stove
improved the Edgingtons' land. Under Utah's statute, it was a man-made addition to real
property similar to infrastructure.
As in the Georgia case, a home and a discrete part of that home may both be
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improvements. The statute does not specifically state which improvement is the relevant
improvement for purposes of the statute of repose, but the Legislature's findings provide
some guidance. In Utah, the clear statement of legislative intent in subsection (2) of our
statute is that providers are to be relieved of the uncertainties and burdens of indefinite
periods of liability. Providers who are subcontractors have no control over the completion
of any but their own improvements. Unless the specific improvements made by
subcontractors are treated separately, the legislative purpose is defeated.
Likewise, if the statute of repose can be reset by asking the subcontractor to make
another improvement to the property, the legislative purpose is also frustrated. For instance,
Mr. Nebeker also installed a furnace, a jetted tub, and then (about six years later) a
downstairs fireplace. That work was separately contracted and unrelated to the pellet stove.
In this case, it is clear that Chad Edgington specifically requested Boyd Nebeker to
install the pellet stove. The Complaint clearly alleges that it was the pellet stove that was
negligently installed. It is clear that regardless of whether they will concede that it is an
"improvement," all parties consider the installation of the pellet stove to be the relevant work
done here.
If State Farm were alleging fault against the general contractor, Plaintiff would have
a more compelling argument that the house was the relevant improvement. However, the
general contractor was the insured homeowner, and State Farm cannot subrogate against its
own insured. Boyd Nebeker, as a subcontractor, has no control over when the construction
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of the entire project is ultimately completed and would have indefinite liability after turning
over the pellet stove to the general contractor if the statute of repose ran from when the
general contractor ultimately completed the project.

This is in contravention of the

Legislature's stated objective of definite liability periods for providers.
B.

National Weight of Authority Favors Treating Subcontract Work Separately
The majority of jurisdictions Defendants have found examining a builder's statute of

repose have reached the same conclusion: that the statute runs from substantial completion
of the subcontractor's individual improvement and not from the completion of the project as
a whole.
The statute of repose is designed to relieve the burdens that increase on providers
over time. It is not intended as a legislative warranty of improvements. Under the plain
language of the statute, it would violate legislative intent as set forth in subsection (2) to
expose providers such as subcontractors to "unlimited liability risks . . . many years after
completion of an improvement." Typically, a subcontractor has little control over when an
entire structure is completed or whether it is ever completed. A subcontractor may finish his
work and then financial, construction, or other delays may keep a structure from being
completed for years after the subcontractor has finished his or her part of the project. Unless
the statute runs from the completion of the subcontractor's installation of an improvement,
the subcontractor is exposed to the all the hardships set forth in subsection (2)(b) indefinitely.
In Ocean Winds Corporation of Johns Island v. Lane, 556 S.E.2d 377 (S.Carolina
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2001) the federal district court certified the question to the Supreme Court of South Carolina
whether substantial completion of the improvement occurs upon substantial completion of
the windows or upon substantial completion of the building as whole. South Carolina held
that substantial completion occurred when the subcontractor installed the windows. To hold
that the statute ran from completion of the building as a whole frustrated the legislative intent
to prevent persons involved in improvements from facing indefinite periods of liability, since
the subcontractor had no power over when the general contractor finished. The improvement
(in that case, the window installation) was complete when the windows were installed and
suddenly subject to "people, forces, and things" beyond the subcontractor's control:
Adopting Ocean Winds' interpretation would frustrate the legislature's
intent in enacting the statute of repose. In the instant case, for example,
installation of the windows was unquestionably completed by December 2,
1986. The windows first became subject to the forces of nature and the
"possibility of neglect, abuse, poor maintenance, mishandling, improper
modification, or unskilled repair" on that date. However, certificates of
occupancy were not issued on all units until May 6, 1991, nearly four and a
half years later. The legislature could not have intended that the date upon
which a subcontractor—clearly a "person[] involved in improvements to real
property"—becomes free from liability with regard to a particular job hinges
upon the diligence of the general contractor and/or developer in completing
construction. To so hold would subject the subcontractor to "the economic and
emotional burdens of litigation and liability for an indefinite period of time."
The purpose of the statute of repose is served where the period prescribed
therein begins to run on the date installation and incorporation into the larger
improvement is complete, rather than the date on which certificates of
occupancy are issued. It is the date of installation and incorporation which
marks the point in time when the windows are first "utilized, changed, and
affected, by "people, forces, and things" beyond Andersen's control.
Id. See also, Hopkins v. Fox &Lazo Realtors, 576 A.2d 921 (NJ.Super. 1990) (statute runs
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from completion of architect's design and not from completion of the house); Gordon v.
Western Steel Company, 950 S.W.2d 743, 749 (Tex.App. 1997) ("Starting the statute of
repose when each subcontractor finishes its improvement conforms with the legislative intent
of preventing indefinite liability for those who construct or repair improvements to real
property"); Industrial Risk Insurers v. Rust Engineering Co., 232 Cal.App.3d 1038,1043-44,
283 Cal.Rptr 873 (1991) (the court does not believe that the legislature intended those
working in construction to "be subject to liability for an indefinite time over 10 years after
substantial completion of their work").
In Fueston v. Burns and McDonnell Engineering, 877 S.W.2d 631 (Mo.App. 1994),
the plaintiff was injured while performing maintenance work on a crane in the building of
his employer, Armco. Defendant Burns and McDonnell had provided engineering services
to Armco at various times, but "maintained that 'the only services related to the crane in
question, or the area where [the plaintiff] was injured, were provided at the time of the
original construction of the building.'" Id. at 634. Plaintiff opposed summary judgment on
the ground that questions of fact surrounded when the improvement was completed because
the meltshop that housed the crane was not finished.
"[T]he trial court interpreted the term improvement' to mean the crane and the
surrounding structure, not the No. 2 Melt Shop in its entirety. The trial court stated that to
hold otherwise would render the statute of repose meaningless, 'since most buildings are
changed from time to time, and therefore they would never be "completed" within the
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meaning of the statute.5" Id. at 635. The appellate court agreed, stating, "[although the No.
2 Melt Shop is an improvement to real property, the crane itself and surrounding structure
also constitute an improvement to real property." Id. at 637. The appellate court affirmed the
summary judgment because, despite the fact that defendants had completed other engineering
services in the building in intervening years, this particular improvement had not been
worked on by defendants since its installation.
The two lead cases standing for the proposition that a statute of repose runs from the
completion of an entire project and not from the substantial completion of a component part
are both distinguishable on their faces. Patraka v. Armco Steel Co., 495 F.Supp. 1013 (M.D.
Penn. 1980) and Smith v. Showalter, 734 P.2d 928 (Wash.App. 1987) are cases from the
1980s that predate all of the cases cited above. Neither case involves the issue of
subcontractors. Patraka was a case involving the design and construction of a highway.
Smith v. Showalter involved faulty wiring in the construction of a home where all
construction work on the home was performed by the defendants themselves. In those cases,
the court refused to divide one project by one builder into artificial subparts in order to put
an activity within the statute of repose. Here, the pellet stove was separately requested and
separately invoiced by a subcontractor who was not the general contractor on the home and
had no control over when the home would eventually be completed.
Daidone v. ButerickBulkheading, 924 A.2d 1193 (N.J. June 26,2007) deals with the
very issue central to this case—what if the homeowner is the general contractor, a
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subcontractor finishes its work outside the actionable time period under the statute of repose,
and the certificate of occupancy is issued within the actionable time period? In Daidone, the
court determined based on the plain language of New Jersey's statute that the statute ran from
when the subcontractor finished its work. The language of New Jersey's statute, admittedly
is different from Utah's, but the equitable considerations are identical. Statutes of repose
simply are not designed to protect homeowners or their insurance companies. They are
designed to protect providers of construction services from having to defend themselves after
documents and witnesses are long gone.
IV.

STATUTE BEGINS TO RUN FROM POSSESSION OF THE IMPROVEMENT
When interpreting Utah's Statute of Repose, Plaintiff ignores possession and conflates

first use and occupancy.

Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-21.5(l)(c) defines

"Completion of improvement" as "the date of substantial completion of an improvement to
real property." That date is defined by statute as the earliest of three events: (1) a certificate
of substantial completion is issued, (2) the city issues the certificate of occupancy, (3) or the
improvement is first used or possessed.
Applying the Legislature's three measures of completion in this matter, it is clear that
possession is the earliest of the three. There is no evidence here of a certificate of substantial
completion. The Certificate of Occupancy was issued April 1991. The pellet stove was
clearly possessed and used prior to April of 1991. Therefore, the earliest of the three dates
in this case was the date the improvement was first used or possessed.
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Plaintiff attempts to wipe out the legislature's third-prong by arguing that "[p]rior to
issuance of a certificate of occupancy, it would have been unlawful for Edgingtons to live
in the house and thus possess the stove as an owner and user." Plaintiffs Brief p.21.
Plaintiff seeks to limit possession to occupancy. That is an artificially narrow reading of the
statute and in clear contravention of legislative intent.
Possession suggests that the contractor or subcontractor has turned over the
improvement to the control of the contracting party. This change in control of the
improvement has nothing to do with occupancy. Equitably, when subcontractors are working
on an improvement, those subcontractors can protect their work and detect and remedy any
tampering. Once the improvement is tendered as complete, the subcontractor loses ability
to control and protect the improvement and the statute of repose begins to run.
The district court focused astutely on the plain meaning of possession as it is used in
Utah's Statute of Repose.
THE COURT: He's building his home. He contracts to get the pellet stove.
It is installed before the home was completed. He is his own general
contractor.
MR. ANDERSON: Yes.
THE COURT: Do you concede that at that point he possessed the stove?
MR. ANDERSON: No.
* * *

THE COURT: So, do you concede that when the stove was installed that in
[sic] date it was possessed by the owner of the property, the owner of the home
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and the builder, the same person?
MR. ANDERSON: We do not concede that.
* * *

THE COURT: My question is, the stove is completely installed, the builder of
the home is his own general contractor, do you concede at that point he
possesses the stove?
MR. ANDERSON: I would argue when it can be used by the homeowner, it
is possessed at that moment.
* * *

THE COURT: Then you claim that there's got to be use and possession
simultaneously?
MR. ANDERSON: No. There's got to be an ability to use in order to possess.
THE COURT: Is that what the statute says?
MR. ANDERSON: No, but I think the statute's - well, admitted, I think
maybe all of us would agree there, is a little bit ambiguous on its face and we
have a little bit of a lack of case law to describe what use means, what
possession means and some of, and even certificate of substantial completion.
(R. 387, 77:24-78:5, 79:14-18 and 80:15-81:8). The district court honed in on the fact that
the statute is written with a disjunctive test. The statute of repose begins to run with either
possession or first use. By defining possession in terms of use or ability to use, Plaintiff
circumvents legislative intent by removing possession as a separate trigger for the statute of
repose.
State Farm cites Agri-Mark, Inc. v. Niro, Inc., 214 F.Supp.2d 33 (D.Mass. 2002) for
the proposition that any improvement must be able to be used to be possessed. However,
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Agri-Mark is a unique fact scenario involving an existing milk dehydration system, which
the plaintiff hired defendant to upgrade from 110,000 pounds per hour to 150,000 pounds per
hour. The federal district court of Massachusetts determined that the upgrade was an
"improvement" under the statute of repose, but determined that the statute ran when the
system was indeed upgraded to 150,000 pounds per hour, as that was the definition of the
improvement in the contract. There is no question about upgrades to existing improvements
in this case, and the holding is not helpful.
Because the contract for the "upgrade" in Agri-Mark was framed in terms of pounds
per hour, it was necessary for the "upgrade" to be in use (producing pounds per hour) in
order to determine whether the contractual pounds per hour had been achieved. Agri-Mark's
idiosyncratic fact pattern links "use" with the completion of the improvement ("the
upgrade"), but does not support State Farm's theory that any improvement under Utah's
Statute of Repose must be used to be possessed.
In the present case, the installation of the pellet stove was a specific contract. When
it was finished, that contract was complete. Plaintiff for the first time on appeal seeks to
aggregate the various contracts Boyd Nebeker had with Chad Edgington (the pellet stove
installation, the Jacuzzi tub installation, and the heating and air conditioning).3 This issue
was not preserved for appeal. Plaintiff admitted that its claim sounded in negligence, and

'Plaintiff relies on Sanchez v. Mica Corp., 950 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997),
which has been vacated in part without opinion, 2003 Tex Lexis 38, Tex. March 27, 2003.
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then the district court asked Plaintiffs counsel how the installation of the furnace or tub
could "be a part of the Statute of Repose where there's no proximate cause." Plaintiffs
counsel responded, "I'm not arguing that, Your Honor."
THE COURT: So do you agree then that we're limited to the pellet stove and
the flue and nothing else?
MR. ANDERSON: For that purpose, yes.
THE COURT: Okay
MR. ANDERSON: But I think that the facts with regards to the other work
Mr. Nebeker did on the subject home are relevant in setting forth when the
acceptance of the pellet stove and the pellet stove flue occurred.
(R. 387, p. 27). The issue of whether Boyd Nebeker's other projects could be aggregated
with the installation of the pellet stove under the Statute of Repose was not preserved. State
Farm "failed to present this argument to the court below and, indeed, conceded" at the
hearing that the installation of the furnace or tub was not part of the Statute of Repose.
"Therefore, [it] may not raise this issue on appeal." Ong International (USA.) Inc. v. 11th
Avenue Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993).
Even if the issue had been preserved, the only admissible evidence regarding the
completion of the other jobs by Mr. Nebeker are the two invoices from November 1990.
V.

AFFIDAVIT OF DALLAS MONSEN PROPERLY STRICKEN
The original summary judgment motion was mailed December 14, 2006. Plaintiffs

opposition was filed December 26, 2006, without any affidavit from Dallas Monsen. There
was no motion from Plaintiffs counsel under Rule 56(f) suggesting that an additional
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affidavit was necessary. In fact, on January 4,2007, Plaintiff requested that the matter be set
for oral argument and certified to the trial court that "this matter is ready for oral argument
and a decision."
Although the Affidavit of Dallas Monsen was dated February 8,2007, it was not sent
to Defendants until shortly before the April 2007 hearing. Plaintiff first mentioned the
Affidavit of Dallas Monsen to the trial court at the hearing on April 19, 2007, where it was
rejected as untimely.
THE COURT: Let me - let me indicate to you, I don't think I can
receive an affidavit on the day of the hearing.
MR. ANDERSON: And I know that.
(R. 387, p.38). The trial court stated that an affidavit had to be timely filed and Mr.
Anderson agreed. (R. 387, p.39)
Plaintiff tried to submit the untimely affidavit on June 27, 2007, as an attachment to
a supplemental memorandum. Defendants moved to strike the affidavit as exceeding the
scope of the requested briefing by the court under Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. No leave of court was sought for the untimely filing. The trial court agreed and
struck the affidavit.
In Pratt v. Nelson, 127 P.3d 1256,1262 (Utah App. 2005) the Utah Court of Appeals
stated "We also conclude that the trial court's decision to strike the Pratts' memorandum as
unauthorized after it was filed one month too late also falls within the trial court's broad
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discretion to manage the case before it." The decision to strike the untimely and unauthorized
affidavit falls within the same broad discretion.
The trial court also ruled that even if the affidavit had been properly filed, paragraphs
4, 6, 7, 8, and 9 were not based on independent recollection, constituted speculation, and
would properly be excluded.
CONCLUSION
The admissible evidence clearly establishes that Boyd Nebeker installed the pellet
stove, billed the Edgingtons for the parts, and turned over possession of the pellet stove to
the Edgingtons in November 1990. The fires that are the subject of this lawsuit occurred on
December 19 and 20, 2002. Therefore, Plaintiffs claims are barred by Utah's Statute of
Repose as set forth in Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-21.5.
DATED this ?3m day of May, 2008.
NELSON, CHIPMAN & BURT

Michael D. Lichfield
Attorneys for Defendants
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TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART II. ACTIONS, VENUE, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
CHAPTER 12. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
ARTICLE 1. REAL PROPERTY
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-215 (2002)
§78-12-21.5. Actions related to
improvements in real property

(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Abandonment" means that there has
been no design or construction activity on the
improvement for a continuous period of one
year.
(b) "Action" means any claim for
judicial, arbitral, or administrative relief for
acts, errors, omissions, or breach of duty
arising out of or related to the design,
construction, or installation of an
improvement, whether based in tort, contract,
warranty, strict liability, indemnity,
contribution, or other source of law.

(f) "Provider" means any person
contributing to, providing, or performing
studies, plans, specifications, drawings,
designs, value engineering, cost or quantity
estimates, surveys, staking, construction, and
the review, observation, administration,
management, supervision, inspections, and
tests of construction for or in relation to an
improvement.
(2) The Legislature finds that:
(a) exposing a provider to suits and
liability for acts, errors, omissions, or breach
of duty after the possibility of injury or
damage has become highly remote and
unexpectedly creates costs and hardships to
the provider and the citizens of the state;

(i) a Certificate of Substantial
Completion;

(b) these costs and hardships include
liability insurance costs, records storage costs,
undue and unlimited liability risks during the
life of both a provider and an improvement,
and difficulties in defending against claims
many years after completion of an
improvement;

(ii) a Certificate of Occupancy issued
by a governing agency; or

(c) these costs and hardships constitute
clear social and economic evils;

(iii) the date of first use or possession
of the improvement.

(d) the possibility of injury and damage
becomes highly remote and unexpected ten
years following completion or abandonment;

(c) "Completion of improvement"
means the date of substantial completion of
an improvement to real property as
established by the earliest of:

(d) "Improvement" means any building,
structure, infrastructure, road, utility, or other
similar man-made change, addition,
modification, or alteration to real property.
(e) "Person" means an individual,
corporation, limited liability company,
partnership, joint venture, association,
proprietorship, or any other legal or
governmental entity.

(e) except as provided in Subsection (7),
it is in the best interests of the citizens of the
state to impose the periods of limitation and
repose provided in this chapter upon all
causes of action by or against a provider
arising out of or related to the design,
construction, or installation of an
improvement.
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(3) (a) An action by or against a provider
based in contract or warranty shall be
commenced within six years of the date of
completion of the improvement or
abandonment of construction. Where an
express contract or warranty establishes a
different period of limitations, the action shall
be initiated within that limitations period.
(b) All other actions by or against a
provider shall be commenced within two
years from the earlier of the date of discovery
of a cause of action or the date upon which a
cause of action should have been discovered
through reasonable diligence. If the cause of
action is discovered or discoverable before
completion of the improvement or
abandonment of construction, the two-year
period begins to run upon completion or
abandonment.
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (3)(b), an
action may not be commenced against a
provider more than 12 years after completion
of the improvement or abandonment of
construction. In the event the cause of action
is discovered or discoverable in the eleventh
or twelfth year of the 12-year period, the
injured person shall have two additional years
from that date to commence an action.
(5) Subsection (4) does not apply to an
action against a provider:
(a) who has fraudulently concealed his
act, error, omission, or breach of duty, or the
injury, damage, or other loss caused by his
act, error, omission, or breach of duty; or
(b) for a willful or intentional act, error,
omission, or breach of duty.
(6) If a person otherwise entitled to bring
an action did not commence the action within
the periods prescribed by Subsections (3) and
(4) solely because that person was a minor or
mentally incompetent and without a legal
guardian, that person shall have two years
from the date the disability is removed to
commence the action.

(7) This section shall not apply to an
action for the death of or bodily injury to an
individual while engaged in the design,
installation, or construction of an
improvement.
(8) The time limitation imposed by this
section shall not apply to any action against
any person in actual possession or control of
the improvement as owner, tenant, or
otherwise, at the time any defective or unsafe
condition of the improvement proximately
causes the injury for which the action is
brought.
(9) This section does not extend the
period of limitation or repose otherwise
prescribed by law or a valid and enforceable
contract.
(10) This section does not create or
modify any claim or cause of action.
(11) This section applies to all causes of
action that accrue after May 3, 1998,
notwithstanding that the improvement was
completed or abandoned before May 3, 1999.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 78-12-25.5, enacted by
L. 1991, ch. 290, § 1; 1997, ch. 149, § 1;
renumbered by L. 1999, ch. 123, § 1.
NOTES:
REPEALS AND REENACTMENTS. -Laws
1991, ch. 290, § 1 repeals former § 78-1225.5, as last amended by Laws 1988, ch. 61, §
1, relating to the seven-year limitation on
actions for injuries due to defective
improvements to real property, effective April
29, 1991, and enacts the present section.
AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 1999
amendment, effective May 3, 1999,
renumbered this section, which formerly
appeared as 78-12-25.5, and rewrote the
section.

